Navigating the Atlantic is an euradio podcast series produced in partnership with the Chair of Transatlantic Trade and Economy of the College of Europe (in cooperation with Microsoft). As global challenges multiply on numerous fronts – namely security and defence, democracy, trade, climate change and energy among many others – this podcast series aims at navigating the currents underlining transatlantic affairs, to shed light on all dimensions and complexities of this historic partnership. In each episode, journalist Lolla Sauty-Hoyer from euradio welcomes one guest and showcases their personal outlook on the state of transatlantic relations in a fireside-chat-like setting. This series is made possible by the participation of the students of the Master of Arts in Transatlantic Affairs (MATA) program of the College of Europe, who contribute to the preparation of these interviews with their precious expertise.
Today for this second episode we talk about the overall state of Transatlantic relations, its impact on the European project and the need for the European Union to establish new bridges with other countries, especially in the global south. And for that we have a special guest, Ilke Toygür, director of the Global Policy Center and professor of European politics at IE University.
Ilke Toygür, welcome and thank you so much for being here with us today.
Thank you very much, thank you.
My first question is about the current state of transatlantic relations. So how would you describe these relations between the US and the EU? And, according to you, what are the main challenges facing the transatlantic partnership today?
With the Trump administration, we have gone through an initial set of collisions now as what we have seen starting from the inauguration day, the role of the tech giants in the new administration. Then we have witnessed a clear collision when Zelensky, the leader of Ukraine and President Trump met in the White House. This has created so many questions about the future of Ukrainian security, when war will end, and what will come afterwards for European security as a whole. And clearly, last but not least, these worries have been completed with the trade war that was started by the US president. So these initial collisions, I think signal us the way forward for the upcoming collision.
You talk about Ukraine, would you say that the war in Ukraine with Russia strengthened or strained the relations between the US and the EU?
I think the Russian invasion of Ukraine revived NATO and revived the security conversation between the European Union and the United States during the Biden administration because we have already witnessed in the previous administration a constant desire to move the security assets of the United States towards Asia. This was very present but with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we have seen a recentering of the efforts in Europe in the previous administration.
What we have seen with the Trump II administration, on the other hand, was an urgent desire to finalize the war without necessarily taking into consideration the stability of the region, the future for Ukraine as an independent state and its European future.
So this has created a major collision with the European actors and this has also created questions about the commitment of the United States to European security and what he wants when it comes to the future of NATO. The question for me is that I think this is very well known and very well accepted by Europeans as well and there is a desire to increase investment in its own depends.But I think we should underline one point now, the European security was designed to be anchored in NATO for a reason. There were other intentions to other institutional setups in the continent. There were various different conversations about if there should be a strategic autonomy when it comes to European defense.
But at the end of the day, there were no credible alternatives and the Americans actually wanted the Europeans to organize the security around NATO and this was accepted by the European actors as well, especially by the ones that are in the East and structurally dependent on American supplies, technology sharing, intelligence sharing, when it comes to security. Today, I think this is something that we should really underline.
This assumption is under question. And for me, for example, the upcoming NATO summit in June is a very good opportunity for the Europeans to think and rethink for the 21st century which NATO Europe wants, and what the actors in the continent will do to get there.
So, according to you, Europe still relies too heavily on the US, especially for its security? And is it possible for Europe to be safe without the US?
I think the answer to this question will depend on the investments and integration efforts that Europeans will be doing in the upcoming years.
Clearly, European countries have very vivid defense industries, but it is the European security by design and by decisions that were taken in the 20th century that is inherently linked to the United States. Of course, the major elephant in the room is the nuclear umbrella. This is a major issue moving forward. And this is why it is very important for me to answer the question, what kind of NATO Europe wants for the 21st century?
Will the European Union continue with these inherent links to the United States or will there be any way of thinking without necessarily eliminating the United States or without cutting the American defense companies from the system? Will there be a new thinking around these issues?
I think this is the key question for June, and for the years moving forward. And this will respond to your question about if the European Union (or Europe as a continent including Norway and the United Kingdom) can defend itself with less commitment from the United States.
Now just to move on the question of European integration with all you already said, would you say that the development in transatlantic relations affected the integration process and how?
Yes, for me I think there are three major effects of the current state of transatlantic relations on the future of European integration.
The first one is clearly security and defence, like all the conversations we have had about the European pillar in NATO, Europeans leading some components of the command structures and securing Ukraine moving forward. All these conversations are opening up on the one hand an integration conversation when it comes to the European defence industry, but it also opens up a conversation about coalitions of the willing and a major coordination with the United Kingdom but also with Norway and Canada when it comes to European security.
So, this is not necessarily just an integration conversation, but it's also different modes of interaction and coordination with other countries moving forward. So, I think this has two impacts on the European project moving forward.
For me, the second area is related to the competitiveness agenda and the use of the European single market moving forward.
Because one of the major issues that we are seeing with the challenges that are coming from the United States is the necessity to access finance. Because Europe has human capital, Europe has innovation, Europe has brilliant ideas in various different sectors, but it lacks investment opportunities. So, for me, the tension with the United States or the current collisions we are facing also opens up the necessity to rethink the single market and complete the integration of the single market which will have a major impact on the European project.
And thirdly and lastly, democracy. For me, the major difference of the Trump II administration is the active undermining of the European political center and the key relationship between the MAGA movement and European extreme right. This is really worrying for me.
So, the European Union has the obligation to rethink the integration dynamics so that it can secure support of citizens for the European integration project, but it can also secure democracy in its member states. And this is definitely easier said than done, but I think we should really put this democracy element as the third and inherently important element when it comes to the future of the European integration project.
Do you see these challenges as a way for Europe to push its sovereignty? Or have the challenges exposed the limits of European sovereignty?
Actually, the decisions that are taken today will answer your question, if this is going to be an enabler of the European integration project, or if this will limit actually the European integration moving forward. I would like to believe that it's going to be the former, and, as I said, there is agency here so there is, both from the citizens’ side and from the decision-makers’ side, there is this opportunity to make this an enabler of European integration projects.
But as I said, both the security and defence dimension, the economy, competitiveness and single market integration dimension and the democracy dimension will be clearly the key dimensions driving the project forward and the decisions taken in this era will actually shape the project moving forward.
In the EU, do you see divisions among the member states in the way to approach the transatlantic relationship?
Yeah, of course. I think this is the moment where there are some common assumptions, like the relationship is changing with the United States, but also there are divisions in the EU because some countries are still desperately trying to maintain the status quo.
We are seeing this especially on the eastern flank and the Baltic states and on the more northeastern part of the European continent. This is very understandably so, because for them the major challenge is coming from Russia, and there's an immediate security threat that is coming from Russia.And according to their perception and their traditional approach, this threat can only be mitigated by the constant help of the United States. This is how it has always been and for them how it is going to be. But for me, I think the key conversation moving forward is that European countries could hope for the best, but the preparation should be done, actually, for the worst.
Because what we are seeing, these collisions that I have been mentioning from the very beginning in security, in trade, in tech regulations, in energy and climate as a part of the multilateral conversation, public rules, et caetera, will only intensify under Donald Trump, and there is no guarantee that there will be a change of administration. So we can see another four or eight years of JD Vance or another MAGA candidate moving forward. So, all the calculations and planifications from the European side will be done accordingly. But the good that might come out of these divisions inside the European Union could be in our favour: some countries could still play an important role in keeping transatlantic relations on track and keeping at least a bare minimum of the transatlantic relations on track and prevent a big failure. So, there might be a division of labour at the end of the day, and we can use these divisions inside the European Union to our favour moving forward.
And so, would you say that the EU should establish new bridges with other countries beyond the transatlantic axis? Why is it important and can it improve the transatlantic relation?
In my opinion, the European Union is already aware of the importance of diversifying its alliances.Clearly, the first dimension that we are seeing very actively pursued by the European Commission is trade. The European Commission is pushing for trade agreements to be concluded with India, but also of course Mercosur. There are conversations with Chile, Indonesia, South Korea, there were so many conversations to formalize, institutionalize bilateral relations between the European Union and other countries beyond the transatlantic axis as you have mentioned. And I think this is a very, very valuable asset. Because the European Union, even if it might have protectionist measures against the United States to respond to the trade war, it is inherently open and the success of its economy comes from its openness to the world.
So, the war in Ukraine exposed the reluctance in the global south to echo Western positions. How can Europe manage to balance its transatlantic commitments with, as you said, the need to have more relations and partnerships with other regions and economies across the world?
I think right now what the European Union should do is open up as many conversations as possible and these conversations are clearly beneficial for the European Union. A bit more tricky conversation is the one with China because, at the end of the first Trump administration, the European Commission intended to sign agreements with China.
Literally, it was the 30th of December of 2020 when the agreement was finalized with China and the European Union tried to move forward. You would remember that, no? It's a comprehensive agreement on investment with China. But when the Biden administration took over the White House, there was a constant effort to synergize the China policy.
And clearly, first the pandemic and then the Russian invasion of Ukraine created this fertile ground to transatlantic cooperation on China policy because the Europeans were, first of all, very struck with the supply chain disruptions that came from the Chinese policies as a response to the pandemic. And then, secondly, they were very struck with the Chinese support for Russian war efforts.
So, for the last years, we have seen a clear coordination and synergies when it comes to China policy. Today, with the current state of transatlantic affairs, we are seeing new voices of the European scene that ask for a separate conversation with China, while many of the challenges in the bilateral relationship between the European Union and China are still there. Starting with the support to Russian war efforts, then protectionism in the Chinese market, you name it. There are various tensions in the bilateral relationship between the European Union and China. So, for me, the conversations with the emerging middle powers are clearly beneficial and the European Union and the member states should do their best to move forward with those. And, in the meantime, leverage these conversations to get the best out of the new willingness to have a discussion with China. But I think the conversations with the emerging middle powers, countries like India, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina will just enforce the position of the European Union on the world stage.
I think, maybe as a final remark, the European Union is facing a moment of change in transatlantic relations, in its security dynamics on the continent and also in its multilateral engagements and its place in global fora.
This moment of change could become an enabler of the new design of the European project for the 21st century, but this really requires agency. Rather than focusing on the divisions in the European Union, we should actually focus on the agency of different actors and agents of change so that the European project could be pushed towards its new version.
Because nothing is going to be the same as it was in the 20th century. The question is, if the European actors have the capacity to design the European projects, will they provide security and prosperity? Because this was the major reason for the existence of any institution and also the European Union, providing security and prosperity to the citizens. So I think there is a real possibility to move the European project to its new self and design the 21st century European integration project with a new promise, and with a new premise of providing security and prosperity to its citizens.
Ilke Toygür, you are director of the Global Policy Center and professor of European politics at IE University. Thank you so much for your time and for answering my questions.
This episode was prepared with the support of MATA students Agathe Lamotte and Antoine Langrée, MATA Assistants Coralie Axelle Ballieu and Marie Ketterlin.
